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Theorists contend that private social groups-particularly those that have no overt political missions 
such as bowling leagues, sports clubs, and choral societies-make major contributions to democracy 
by generating engagement with democracy in the form of political interest and participation. Although 
this discussion is generally at an aggregate level, it is based on seldom-tested assumptions about indi- 
vidual-level phenomena. This study expands our understanding of how (and where) memberships in 
various groups are associated with political engagement of individual citizens. We test if the effects 
of group membership vary across eleven European democracies and test which types of groups have 
the strongest association with political engagement. We find that major social groups differ in their 
relationship with engagement, and we also find that formal political arrangements for group accom- 
modation may condition the effects of some memberships on engagement. 
The work of Robert Putnam has done much to reestablish the relevance of vol- 
untary social groups and the potential role that these groups play in maintaining 
democratic practices (Putnam 1993, 1995; see also Norris 1996; Verba, Schloz- 
man, and Brady 1995). The nub of this argument is well known: private civic 
associations-particularly those that have no overt political missions such as 
bowling leagues, sports clubs, and choirs-make major contributions to the build- 
ing of politically relevant human and social capital (see also Almond and Verba 
1963; Barber 1995, 281; Pateman 1970). Kim (2000) refers to this group of schol- 
ars as the neo-Tocquevillians. 
Although social capital has often been discussed in terms of aggregate-level 
indicators, there are, or at least should be, clear individual-level implications of 
the phenomena. Yet, as Hooghe (1999) notes, there is surprisingly little empiri- 
cal work on the individual-level effects of civic associations given how impor- 
tant they are held to be in the social science literature. Although we have 
individual-level models of people's interest in and engagement with politics, if 
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group membership is important then these models are underspecified in impor- 
tant ways. By the same token, if a focus on group membership and engagement 
with democratic politics ignores individual-level motivations for interest and 
activity then these models, too, may be underspecified and overstate the impact 
of group membership. One notable exception to a compartmentalized approach 
is that of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) who model political engagement 
in the United States as being driven by group membership, most importantly 
membership in church groups. As with the work by Putnam, this raises the ques- 
tion of how much we can generalize beyond the case of America. Specifically, 
does a model of political engagement that takes account of the effects of group 
membership "work" outside the United States, or are there amendments that need 
to be made? If the model is general and it does work across several nations, does 
it hold for all groups? 
In this article we answer these questions by modelling political engagement in 
11 European nations as a function of both individual-level attributes, including 
membership in groups, and national-level context. We do so using a hierarchical 
linear modelling (HLM) approach. Importantly, this approach allows us to take 
account of cross-national differences in the ways in which some groups are for- 
mally incorporated into the political system. 
Participation, Social Capital, and Political Engagement 
Arguments about the effects of social capital on democracy overlap with con- 
temporary theories of participatory democracy that stress citizens are not isolated 
beings. Social organizations thus play an important "educative" role in teaching 
people how to tolerate each other, how to interact and work together, and how to 
act socially as well as politically. Such participation also provides them with a 
greater sense of efficacy and trust (Mansbridge 1980, 236; Pateman 1970, 42-46) 
and may make individuals more public spirited (Warren 1992, 8). 
Coleman (1990, 302) advances similar propositions using the rubric of social 
capital-a macrolevel resource that enhances a polity's ability to act collectively. 
Putnam, in particular, stresses the importance of individual-level, nonpolitical 
participation as a means for providing the social capital that a nation needs to 
maintain healthy democratic practices. For Putnam (1993), participation in soccer 
clubs and choral groups, or, in the case of the United States, bowling as part of 
a league rather than solitary bowling, generates face-to-face interactions that 
build networks and trust, and over time, human capital. By joining social groups, 
citizens learn democratic norms and thus establish the basis for effective demo- 
cratic practices. Social capital may also be built at the national level as citizens' 
networks of relations expand via participation in social groups. 
One of the most thorough microanalyses of the impact of social groups is found 
in the civic voluntarism model of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995). In addi- 
tion to noting the impact of individual-level attributes such as education, income, 
and socialization processes, Verba et al. also highlight the importance of group 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:05:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Group Membership and Political Engagement in Europe 1113 
and, in particular, church membership: "Running a rummage sale to benefit the 
church day care center or editing a church newsletter provides opportunities for 
the development of skills relevant to politics even though the enterprise is 
expressly non-political" (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 383). 
Central to the debates about the importance of voluntary membership in social 
groups is the causal proposition that membership produces democratic virtues of 
the kind noted above. However, although attempts have been made to refine the 
theories into clear causal statements, they have not yet been tested very thor- 
oughly, especially within Europe (Hooghe 1999; Newton 1997). Extant studies 
that do attempt to advance causal propositions about determinants and effects of 
social capital typically focus on individual nations (for the United States, see 
Brehm and Rahn 1997; for Belgium, see Hooghe 1999; for Great Britain, see 
Moyser and Parry 1997; in contrast, see Booth and Richard 1998 on Central 
America). This research clearly advances our understanding of the effects of vol- 
untary associations, yet most existing studies do not assess how these effects vary 
across types of groups and across established democracies that have different 
methods of incorporating citizens into the political system. 
In addition, the question remains open as to whether some groups are better 
than others as incubators of democratic virtues or whether all groups are equally 
good in that regard. Putnam notes that Tocqueville wrote that "serious, futile, very 
general and very limited, immensely large and very minute" organizations alike 
would instil the habits of public spiritedness (1993, 90). Seemingly quite differ- 
ent groups, such as bowling leagues and choirs, are often lumped together as the 
kinds of associations that generate political engagement. The expectation seems 
to be that any group is just as good as any other, but this may not be the case. 
Some groups may be better at encouraging engagement than others. Labor 
unions, human rights organizations (Amnesty International), and environmental 
groups (Greenpeace), for example, have an obvious political dimension. It is not 
so obvious that sports groups (membership in a soccer club) or arts groups 
(choirs) have such a dimension. 
Variation in Group Effects and Variation in Institutional Context 
The question of whether there is likely to be variation in the impact of group 
membership is, typically, left unstated in this literature; however recent work has 
began to identify that groups differ in their internal diversity and in the solidar- 
ity they may breed. Stolle and Rochon observed different effects of group mem- 
bership on trust and optimism in three nations, and cautioned that "a generalized 
enthusiasm for the effects of association membership must be tempered by a spec- 
ification of what types of groups we are talking about" (1998, 57). 
As Table 1 illustrates, there is substantial variation across European nations in 
the propensity for citizens to join voluntary associations and in the types that they 
join. The first column lists the percentage who reported membership in an at least 
one voluntary social group in 1990. Some of the groups (such as charities, arts, 
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TABLE 1 
Voluntary Group Membership in 12 European Nations 
Percentage of population who are members of: 
% mentioning any 
group (omitting sports church- 
Nation parties and unions) group/club based group arts group/club 
Netherlands 71.0 35.2 26.9 10.7 
Denmark 70.5 34.8 20.9 10.3 
Great Britain 54.6 23.8 19.4 6.8 
Ireland 52.3 25.6 17.5 3.8 
Belgium 51.0 21.9 8.9 14.0 
W. Germany 49.2 27.9 15.9 4.9 
France 38.5 16.1 6.2 6.3 
Italy 31.6 10.2 8.8 6.5 
Spain 23.2 8.3 5.9 3.3 
Portugal 22.6 11.5 5.6 4.6 
Greece 15.9 6.5 1.8 5.6 
Note: Cell entries are percentages of respondents claiming membership. The first column omits 
membership in political parties and labor unions, and includes church groups, arts groups, human 
rights groups, ecology groups, youth groups, consumer organizations, sports groups, and "other" 
social groups. 
Source: Eurobarometer 34.0, November 1990. 
and sports groups) have far less overt political content than others (such as con- 
sumer groups or human rights groups). According to these 1990 Eurobarometer 
#34 data, the most common voluntary, nonpolitical groups that citizens join are 
sports groups. After sports clubs, unions, and church groups, the next most com- 
monly cited membership was in arts groups. When memberships in unions and 
political parties are omitted, as with the data listed in Table 1, in most nations at 
least half of all voluntary group membership can be attributed to nonpolitical 
associations such as sports and arts groups, with much of the remaining balance 
being membership in church groups. 
We test if memberships in various groups differ in their association with polit- 
ical engagement. These groups are not alike in how they bring people together, 
and not all social theorists are sanguine about the effects that certain voluntary 
social groups might have on democracy. Indeed, Kim (2000) illustrates that the 
groups Putnam identified as beneficial bred, for Max Weber, a passivity inimical 
to democracy. Sports clubs, in particular, constitute a category that likely cap- 
tures a broad range of possible social interactions. Media images of European 
soccer fans do little to offer encouragement for the hypothesis that membership 
in such groups is associated with civic virtues. Even sports groups that require 
more active participation (i.e., playing sports versus simply watching or being a 
booster) may have questionable effects on civicness, since one of the primary 
social interactions that the group experiences is competition. In their study of 
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voluntary associations in Germany, Sweden, and the U.S.A., Stolle and Rochon 
(1998) include sports clubs in the same category as hobby groups and car clubs, 
since these groups are organized around private, personal interests that are not 
expected to generate as much intragroup or intergroup trust and solidarity as other 
forms of association. 
By contrast, one of the next largest categories of nonpolitical, voluntary group 
membership in Europe is arts clubs. As with sports groups, this category cap- 
tures a wide range of variation in types of groups, including theatre groups, quilt- 
ing bees, music performance groups, literary societies, choral groups, dance 
groups, folk art groups, and the like. There are also reasons to expect that par- 
ticipation in arts groups in particular would be associated with greater political 
engagement than sports clubs. Advocates of the arts claim that art plays a fun- 
damental role in democratic societies by integrating minority ideas into the 
culture (Arian 1989; Blandy and Congdon 1987, 76). The arts also generate face- 
to-face contacts that might bridge cultural divides, while exposing people to a 
wider variety of experiences and ideas (Boyer 1987). Most importantly, much art 
that is not the least bit avant-garde requires a substantial degree of group effort 
and coordination built upon individual sacrifice and consensus (Arian 1989, 111). 
The product of interactions in arts groups is often public and, relative to sports 
groups, noncompetitive. 
Another way in which the neo-Tocquevillian argument is incomplete is that it 
can be read as saying that a fluid, informal relationship between voluntary asso- 
ciation and civil society is either the only or the best way of promoting demo- 
cratic engagement. National-level political context, however, may play a role. 
Tarrow (1996) specifically criticizes Putnam for failing to recognize that the 
Italian state itself may have stimulated high levels of associational activity. Other 
scholars have faulted Putnam for failing to consider how a nation's political "rules 
of the game" shape civil society. Foley and Edwards (1996) stress the contextual 
effect of political repression on civil society in El Salvador, while Booth and 
Richard (1998) demonstrate that regime repression in Central America depressed 
individual-level trust, democratic norms, and political participation. Indeed, as 
Table 1 illustrates, nations with the most recent history of political repression 
(Portugal and Greece) have the lowest levels of reported group membership. 
If levels of political engagement are tied to skills learned by the society as a 
whole via group activity, then these nations may have less of a base for creating 
engaged citizens. Although people residing in longer-lived democracies like 
Great Britain may have some very general sense of how to engage in politics, 
such learning may not be as well established in Portugal or Greece. Given this, 
we need to account for national-level effects on political engagement associated 
with whether a respondent lives in a newer (e.g., Portugal) or an older democ- 
racy (e.g., England).' Overlapping the length of a nation's democratic experience 
'Older democracies include Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, and The Netherlands. Newer 
democracies include Greece and Portugal. The reference category includes Ireland, Italy, and Spain. 
See also note 8. 
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is the overall wealth of a country. At the individual level we may expect to see 
wealthier people more actively engaged with democratic politics, because they 
may have the economic interests, time, or resources to do so. Analogously, we 
might expect to see that wealthier nations provide a social context that facilitates 
higher levels of political engagement. 
Other cross-national differences may also shape the impact of group member- 
ship. Studies of the consensus democracies argue that formal political institutions 
incorporate people into politics and may build civic virtue from the "top down" 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997; Lijphart 1999). They stress that formal political 
incorporation via consensual politics generates participation and also satisfaction 
with democracy. In some nations political incorporation of groups is state- 
sanctioned and formalized to the point of hierarchical, corporatist arrangements. 
In others, social groups compete for influence in a more informal, pluralistic 
arena. The terms "corporatism" and "pluralism" are not only markers for distinct 
versions of democracy, but they also provide quite different examples of associ- 
ational relations that affect how some group memberships, most notably in labor 
unions, are shaped by formal political institutions. We suggest that membership 
in some voluntary nonpolitical groups in a corporatist nation might not be as rel- 
evant in facilitating political engagement, if only for the fact that the nation's 
formal political institutions might play a larger role in doing this. 
Similarly, the individual-level impact of church-group membership and specif- 
ically of denomination noted by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) may well 
vary by the nation's religious context. European states are distinct from the United 
States in often having dominant religions: broadly speaking, Catholic in the south, 
Protestant in the north. In some cases this dominance is reflected in the status of 
being a state church. As with groups in corporatist states, membership in church 
groups in Europe may involve ties to the wider political structure. Moreover, if 
membership in Protestant churches in Europe is associated with greater levels of 
voluntary activity, as in America (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 320-25), 
then models estimating political engagement as a function of group activity need 
to control for national religious context. 
European democracies thus provide interesting cases in which to see if 
national-level context shapes and conditions the impact of group memberships. 
With the models specified below, we can test how national-level and individual- 
level variables affect political engagement. 
Hypotheses, Data, and Measures 
We assess the following questions: do voluntary organizations engender civic 
virtues, and if they do, what sort of groups are best for generating them? As 
Newton (1997) and Hooghe (1999) point out, these questions have not been well- 
tested empirically, and any statistical tests will ultimately be unable to establish 
exactly what the direction of the relationship may be. Still, testing the theory with 
available cross-sectional data advances our understanding of the role that group 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:05:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Group Membership and Political Engagement in Europe 1117 
membership has in democratic societies. Data for our analyses are taken from 
Eurobarometer 34.0, conducted in November of 1990. This survey not only pro- 
vides responses to appropriate questions of political engagement and participa- 
tion, but also asks respondents about their activities in social groups. This survey 
thus provides a reasonable data set from which to assess the questions at hand 
across a wide range of national settings.2 
Responses to four questions were combined to create a single index reflecting 
an individual's engagement with democratic politics. We combine measures of 
how frequently the respondent discusses politics with friends, whether an indi- 
vidual tries to convince others of their views, how interested the individual is in 
politics, and whether the individual is a member of a political party.3 Table Al in 
the online appendix presents a fuller description of the index. Each of these 
measures-taken individually-is unlikely to capture all aspects of political 
engagement. As an index, however, they do tap into a relatively broad range of 
participatory behavior and political engagement. If membership in informal, non- 
political groups has an effect on engagement, we would see a significant associ- 
ation between group membership and this measure in models that control for 
other individual-level and national-level forces operating on engagement.4 
The key independent variables of interest are group memberships. Information 
about nine different kinds of group membership is available in this survey, includ- 
ing church groups, unions, and other groups." Some of our measures of volun- 
2Listwise deletion of cases with missing scores resulted in final samples of about 1,000 observa- 
tions in each of 11 nations (see Table A2 in the online appendix for descriptive statistics on the dis- 
tribution of the dependent variable in each nation). The original data set includes adequate samples 
for 12 nations. Norway is excluded here because some attitudinal measures are lacking for that nation. 
3To measure attempts at convincing others (ICPSR study 9576, V69), respondents were asked 
"when you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow 
workers to share your views? Does this happen: often [coded 3], from time to time [2], rarely, never 
[1]?" For frequency of discussion (V70), "when you get together with friends, would you say you 
discuss political matters frequently [2], occasionally [1], or never [0]?" For interest (V75), they were 
asked, "to what extent would you say you are interested in politics? A great deal, [3] To some extent 
[2], Not much [1], Not at all [0]?" For membership in a party (V61) see wording in footnote 5 below. 
Each item is standardized and weighted equally in our index which is the sum of these four terms. 
The resulting Cronbach's alpha is .61. See Table Al in the online appendix for more details about 
reliability and covariation among items in the index. 
4 We also estimated models taking each of these measures as a separate dependent variable. Results 
are displayed in the online appendix. Use of this index also makes the presentation of our results 
much more parsimonious. Tables A4a-A4d of the online appendix provide models estimating 
responses to each of the 44 items, in each of the 11 nations (i.e., 44 separate models). In addition 
these tables also include estimates using the pooled sample from all nations to estimate logistic and 
ordered logistic regression models of individual items in the index. Results from these estimations 
do not challenge the substantive results presented in this article. 
5 Respondents were asked "which, if any, of the following groups or associations do you belong 
to?" They were shown a card listing the following, and multiple responses were permitted: charities, 
religious or church groups, cultural/arts groups, trade union or professional association, human rights 
organizations, nature conservation/ecology groups, youth groups, consumer groups, sports club or 
associations, or "other specific groups." See ICPSR study 9576 variables 57-66. 
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tary social group membership in particular-those associated with membership 
in arts, charity, church, sports, and youth groups-are of special interest since 
these are not as obviously "political" as most of the other types of groups 
measured here. We test the hypothesis that membership in voluntary groups 
has a positive association with political engagement even after we control for 
individual-level factors associated with engagement. Further, the social capital 
literature leads us to expect this hypothesis will hold across all types of groups, 
for both obviously "political" groups (human rights groups, environmental 
groups) as well as the not so obviously political informal groups identified by the 
Tocquevillians as being important (arts and sports clubs in particular). 
Although a strict reading of the social capital literature leads us to expect this 
hypothesis to hold across different nations, we anticipate that the effects of group 
membership might be greater in pluralistic states since formal incorporation of 
interests may mute the independent effects of group membership in corporatist 
nations. We test for this possibility by including terms that represent the effects 
of interactions between an individual's membership in a group, and her nation's 
level of interest group pluralism (IGP).6 
Demographic and attitudinal factors at the individual-level also affect political 
involvement and engagement, and must, therefore, be controlled for in our 
models. Measures of educational attainment, gender, income, class, age, nonrural 
residence, religion, and perceptions of financial well-being (during the last year) 
are all included as control variables in the models. Categorical measures of these 
allow us to see any nonlinear effects associated with these variables. Religion is 
coded with three dummy variables for Catholics, Protestants, and other religions, 
respectively. The reference category for religion is those who did not categorize 
themselves in terms of any particular faith. For age, the reference group is 45-54, 
the high point of civic engagement over the life-cycle, and for income the refer- 
ence group are those who replied "don't know or refused to answer."' The refer- 
ence group for perceptions of finances are those who felt their situations had not 
changed over the last year, and the reference category for education are those 
with the lowest levels. Working-class individuals are represented by a dummy 
variable reflecting self-identification. Our general assumptions are that the inde- 
pendent effects of nonrural residence, higher education, higher income, being 
nonworking class, being Protestant, and perceiving that personal finances have 
improved, will each be associated with higher levels of engagement. 
Our estimates also account for whether the respondent was on the winning or 
losing side in the last national legislative election in their nation, since those 
backing losing parties can be more likely to be disengaged from politics (Ander- 
son and Guillory 1997; Listhaug 1998). Respondents counted as being on the 
6See Lijphart (1999, 171-84) for extended discussion of this measure and its correlation with a 
"consensus" model of democracy. Higher scores reflect more pluralism, low scores more corporatism. 
7Interpretation of this reference is less intuitive than the others, but it allows us to retain respon- 
dents who refuse to disclose their incomes. 
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losing side are those who did not vote for the parties that formed government 
after the recent election. We also control for the relative extremity of one's polit- 
ical views: an individual who self-identifies as either quite left-wing or quite 
right-wing is likely to be more engaged in politics than someone who does not 
see herself in such terms. We represent this by folding the standard left/right self- 
placement scale into a single measure reflecting self-placement at either extreme. 
Further, those with the most ideological views who support parties that are out 
of power may well be even more engaged with politics, since they may be rela- 
tively more politically sophisticated while also having grievances with the polit- 
ical order. We capture this with a term interacting our measure of ideological 
extremity with the measure of having been a recent "loser" in the electoral arena. 
In addition we included a measure of post-materialism and the standard left-right 
conservativism scale from which the extremism score was constructed. We also 
include a count of the total number of groups to which an individual belongs as 
another control. By including all of these factors affecting political engagement, 
we can be more confident that any correlation we observe between group mem- 
bership and engagement is nonspurious. 
The discussion above highlights national-level factors that could affect a 
citizen's engagement, if not condition the effects of various individual-level 
factors. Interest group pluralism (vs. corporatism) in each nation is measured by 
Lijphart's index (Lijphart 1999, 177). This measure ranges from high and positive 
for pluralist cases to nearer zero for the more corporatist cases. Other national- 
level variables in the models represent older and newer European democracies and 
a measure of each nations' per capita income.s We expect that individuals in newer 
and poorer democracies will see generally lower levels of political engagement as 
a consequence of living in societies with fewer democratic resources. 
We also included a variable representing each nation's religious context by 
including a measure of the percentage of the overall population who are Catholic. 
Extending the finding of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) from individuals 
to the national level, we expect to see predominantly Catholic states exhibit gen- 
erally lower levels of political engagement. Alternatively, where Catholics are 
closer to majority or plurality status in a nation, religious homogeneity may lead 
some Catholics to be more engaged with politics. We include interactions 
between an individual's religion and her nation's religious context (measured as 
percent Catholic) to test for this.9 Finally, we control for the effect of high reli- 
gious attendance for Protestants and Catholics, respectively. 
8 The age of democracy category measures the aggregate democratic experience that citizens might 
have in each of these nations at the time of the 1990 Eurobarometer survey. Old democracies are 
defined as those having age cohorts who may have experienced democratic elections prior to WWII. 
These include Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, The Netherlands, and West Germany. Newer, 
post-WWII democracies include Greece and Portugal. Our results do not change when Spain is moved 
from the reference category to the new democracy category. 
9Table A3 in the online appendix displays correlations among the national-level variables used 
here. 
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Model Specification 
Our hypotheses combine to model political engagement as a function of factors 
at two different levels of analysis: the individual and the national. The main 
hypotheses concern the individual-level effects of group membership after con- 
trolling for other individual-level attributes and national-level contextual effects 
on individuals. One way to address the effects of national attributes is by using 
hierarchical inear modelling, or HLM, a modelling technique designed to isolate 
such contextual, cross-system differences (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). HLM is 
used to generate simultaneous estimates of the individual-level equation's param- 
eters while allowing national differences in both slopes and intercepts.1o 
One way of thinking about HLM is that, in order to obtain estimates of the 
impact of second-level (national) effects on individuals (in this instance the 
impact of interest group pluralism, age of democracy, GNP per capita, and per- 
centage Catholic), we perform a regression estimation at the individual level of 
a model along the lines of Equation (1). 
Yij = floj + flj member union organizationij + 12j member sports groupij 
+ 33j member church groupij + 34j member charityij 
+ ps, member arts groupij + 06j genderij 
+ "67j college education + - - - + rij (1) 
Here Y is the dependent variable for individuals (i) expressed as deviation from 
the mean of each country (j), and it is modelled as a function of membership in 
groups plus some other attributes (here gender and education); r is the error term 
that expresses residual variation of individuals' scores from the mean of their 
nation and becomes especially relevant in calculating measures of fit. In HLM 
we can go further and model both intercepts (3oj) and slopes (1fj) as nation spe- 
cific. The coefficients of the "random coefficients" regression model (3oj and Pri) 
in Equation (1) serve as the dependent variables in simultaneous group-level 
regression estimates. So, for example, we might think that there are significant 
differences between nations according to both the degree of formal group mem- 
bership (IGP, the corporatist-pluralist continuum) and the position of the 
Catholic church, e.g., 
o0j = Yq0 + qllGPj + Yq2 %Catholiclj + uqj (2) 
Equation (2) models differences in the intercept in Equation (1) as a function 
of national level variables, here a nation's IGP score and the share of the overall 
population who are Catholic. We can also model second-level (here national) dif- 
ferences in the size of the parameters in Equation (1). In which case we might 
see the parameter associated with, say, membership in a labor union amplified by 
the role of unions in a more pluralist country, e.g., 
1lj 
= Yg'qj + YqlGPij + 
uq 
(3) 
10Calculations were performed using HLM 5 (Raudenbush et al. 2000). 
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The right-hand side variables in Equations (2) and (3) are "second-level" 
effects measured at the national level while u is the error term for the second 
level (and, as with "r" from Equation (1) becomes important in calculating good- 
ness of fit measures below) . Equation (2) allows the adjusted mean of the indi- 
vidual-level dependent variable to differ from one nation to another and for these 
differences to be modelled. Equation (3) allows the effects of independent vari- 
ables on dependent variables at the individual level (e.g., the effect of being a 
member of an arts group on the dependent variable) to differ from one nation to 
another and for these differences to be modelled. 
In the results that are reported in Table 2, two models are estimated. Model 1 
contains only effects of national-level covariates on means (that is, there are no 
covariates as in Equation 3), whereas Model 2 is specified such that effects of 
covariates on the slopes of independent variables are included. Although HLM 
models are relatively complex in that they operate at two levels of analysis simul- 
taneously, the interpretation of regression coefficients is very much the same as 
in any other linear regression. That is, coefficients express effects of unit changes 
(or group differences from a reference category in the case of dummy inde- 
pendent variables) on outcomes (either means or slopes). 
Using the impact of pluralism (as measured with the nation's IGP score) as an 
example, one question of interest is not just whether there are differences in polit- 
ical engagement between pluralist and nonpluralist states (i.e., a version of Equa- 
tion 2) but also to see whether, for example, the impact of particular types of 
group membership vary across nations (a version of Equation 3). And so, con- 
ceptually, we can take the parameter associated with the impact of group mem- 
bership on individual political engagement (Equation 1) and see if the size of this 
parameter varies across pluralist and nonpluralist states (Equation 3). The flexi- 
bility of HLM means that we can do this for a number of second-level effects- 
including age of democracy, religious context, and aggregate levels of wealth-at 
the same time, in order to look for intercept shifts. 
HLM cannot demonstrate causality, but it provides a more rigorous test of asso- 
ciation than standard regression models. Although we cannot sort out selection 
effects with this approach, a key hypothesis here is that, after controlling for both 
individual-level effects and also cross-national effects, we should see a positive 
correlation between political engagement and membership in nonpolitical groups 
if the neo-Toquevillian thesis can be generalized across all nations and all types 
of groups. 
Results 
Table 2 presents results of HLM estimates of our models for the primary vari- 
ables of interest. These estimates were generated with models that also included 
additional control variables. Coefficients for the additional attitudinal and demo- 
graphic controls are listed in Table 2A at the end of this article. The two left-most 
columns in Table 2 and Table 2A are estimates of equations of the type (1) and 
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TABLE 2 
Hierarchical Linear Models Estimating Civic Engagement in Europe 
Model 1: Effects on Means Model 2: Effects on Means and Slopes 
Level of Effect Level of Effect 
Individual National Indiv National Interactions* 
Contextual Measures Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e. 
Interest Group Pluralism -.114 .056 -.105 .106 
Old Democracy -.425 .114 -.363 .113 
New Democracy -1.138 .202 -1.074 .200 
GNP -.035 .018 -.029 .017 
Pct. Catholic -.017 .001 -.017 .015 
Intercept -.001 .104 -.001 .106 
Group memberships 
Sports group memb .024 .154 .073 .118 -.032 .054 
Church group memb .111 .199 .104 .202 -.059 .084 
Nature/Env. group memb .486 .211 .509 .214 .259 .115 
Arts group memb .432 .176 .433 .180 .043 .071 
Consumer group memb .527 .221 .532 .246 -.045 .175 
Charity group memb .686 .201 .685 .202 -.057 .105 
Human rights group memb .820 .276 .827 .387 .331 .231 
Union member .854 .177 .859 .168 .282 .077 
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Post-Materialism 
Materialist - 
Mixed 1.044 .179 1.042 .179 
Post-Materialist .427 .096 .425 .096 
Religion 
Catholic -.351 .124 -.32 .126 -.002 .003 
Protestant -.826 .278 -.80 .265 -.003 .004 
Other religion .299 .212 -.283 .205 -.003 .005 
No religion - 
Hi Relig. attnd* Prot. -.783 .843 .769 .833 
Hi Relig. attnd* Cath. -.612 .561 -.657 .564 
Number of Cases 10,629 10,629 
Model 1 % reduction Model 2 % reduction over 
Fit Base-line Model Model 1 over baseline Model 2 baseline 
Individual level 91.6% 
National level 8.4% 
U (national level residual) .63 .11 83 .11 83 
R (individual level residual) 6.81 5.069 25 5.075 26 
* The first set of interactions are R's group membership * national-level IGP, the second are R's religion * percent Catholic in nation. 
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(2), while columns 3, 4, and 5 report estimates that includes the kinds of effects 
represented in Equation (3) above. 
There are two sets of coefficients to discuss associated with Model 1 and three 
sets to discuss associated with Model 2. Model 1 produces coefficients repre- 
senting individual-level and national-level effects on individuals, while Model 2 
produces coefficients that reflect individual-level effects, national-level effects, 
and the effects of cross-level interactions. By and large most kinds of group 
membership are associated with higher levels of political engagement. The two 
notable and consistent exceptions to this are sports and youth groups." 
This is an interesting finding since these are the groups identified in the neo- 
Tocquevillian literature as needed to promote political engagement. The null asso- 
ciation between sports groups and engagement can be seen in both of the HLM 
models in Table 2, and in nation-specific logistic regression estimations where 
each item from our engagement measure was used as separate dependent vari- 
ables (these estimates are available in the online appendix, Table A4). Although 
it seems clear that most memberships are associated with increased engagement, 
not all groups are equally important. Groups that might be seen as overlapping 
with the political arena (environmental groups, consumer groups, unions, and 
human rights groups) are all associated with higher engagement. Of the groups 
that are of greater interest to neo-Tocquevillians-the relatively nonpolitical vol- 
untary groups--charities and arts groups have much stronger associations with 
political engagement than church and sports groups.12 
This pattern of group membership effects stands up, even after accounting for 
national-level contextual effects. The second column of Table 2 shows the results 
for the national-level effects as estimated via Model 1. Here we see several pat- 
terns of note. The first is that level of interest-group pluralism with a country- 
our measure of the lack of formal, corporatist group incorporation-has no direct 
impact on an individual's overall level of political engagement. The national-level 
effect of Catholicism mirrors the individual-level findings reported by Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady (1995), even after controlling for wealth effects both at 
the individual-level and nationally. Respondents from nations with more 
Catholics have lower levels of engagement. Finally, individuals from countries 
that had little experience with democratic elections until after WWII-nations 
where democratic resources are likely to be sparse-had the lowest levels of polit- 
" Use of the number of group memberships as a variable introduces linear dependence as it is the 
sum of all group memberships. This requires that one of the group membership measures must be 
omitted-we omit youth groups. When it is included without the measure of total group member- 
ships, it is not significant. 
12 Any specification we used produced weak results for the effects of sports groups on civic engage- 
ment, relative to the effects of other groups. As the online appendix illustrates, there is some evi- 
dence that membership in sports groups is associated with one element of our civic engagement 
measure (interest: for Denmark, France, and Ireland). In no nation is sports-group membership asso- 
ciated with more than one item from our dependent variable. Moreover, the effect of membership in 
sports groups is associated with significantly less engagement in some estimations. 
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ical engagement. Contrary to expectations, respondents from the older democra- 
cies had lower levels of engagement than those in "middle-aged" democracies.13 
There are also other significant individual-level effects on political engage- 
ment, in addition to the effects of membership in groups. Recall that we do not 
assume that effects of all individual-level variables are likely to be linear. Hence, 
we break down education into several different categorical variables measuring, 
for example, medium- and high-levels of education. Even though there are pos- 
itive effects for a moderate education level, the effects for higher education (uni- 
versity-level graduate or university student) are greater with a parameter roughly 
twice as large (the HLM estimates of Table 2 and Table 2A can be compared 
directly as in OLS). 
A similar effort to capture possible nonlinearity is seen in our estimation of 
the effects of age, income, and perceptions of personal finances. Of these, age in 
particular displays nonlinearities suggestive of a life-cycle effect-people in the 
youngest and oldest age categories are significantly less engaged with politics 
than those in the reference group (45-54). Other demographic variables are asso- 
ciated with greater engagement. The independent effects of being male, an urban 
resident, nonreligious (the reference category for the individual-level religion 
variables), perceiving personal finances as most improved, and being in the top 
income bracket, are each associated with higher scores on our measure of engage- 
ment. We also find that citizens with relatively extreme ideological orientations 
are more engaged with politics, while people who rate themselves as relatively 
more conservative are less engaged. 
Model 2 (Columns 3, 4, and 5) displays the individual-level effects of group 
membership estimated as functions of national-level variables. Model 2 builds on 
the results of Model 1 in two ways. In Model 2 we examine if formal corporatist 
arrangements at the societal level amplify or mute the impact of individual mem- 
bership in voluntary organizations. Similarly, this model tests if the impact of 
religious affiliation is shaped by the wider religious environment: members of a 
church could, for example, behave differently when their denomination is in a 
minority within a society than when it is in a majority. 
We can see in column 3 that the individual-level effects of group membership 
hold up when we account for cross-level interactive effects associated with plu- 
ralism and the nation's religious context. Results in column 5 (the group*IGP 
interactive effects) demonstrate that pluralism-or the lack of corporatism-con- 
ditions how membership in some groups is associated with engagement. Plural- 
ism is associated with higher levels of engagement among union members and 
members of environmental groups. That is, in nations that lack formalized incor- 
poration of groups, the effects of these memberships on political engagement are 
even more pronounced. In general, however, the effects of involvement in groups 
on an individual's engagement with democratic politics is typically direct and 
"3Again, see note 8. The reference category includes Ireland, Italy, and Spain. 
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does not usually depend on the degree of pluralism or corporatism of the national 
system. 14 
Second, the cross-level interactions between an individual's religion and 
national religious context (Relig. * % Catholic) illustrate that Catholics have 
lower levels of engagement regardless of the percentage of Catholics in a nation. 
Contrary to our expectations, Protestants are the least engaged-regardless of 
whether they reside in a predominately Catholic nation or not. 
The goodness-of-fit for models of this type is assessed by examining the resid- 
ual variation at both the individual-level (that is, how much of the variation of 
individuals from their nation's means is not explained) and the national-level (that 
is, how much of the variation in national means is not explained by composi- 
tional differences in the samples from different nations and the measured 
national-level differences). One of the virtues of HLM is that it helps to see where 
the main variance is to be explained-either at the individual or aggregated-level. 
Table 2 lists a baseline model fit with none of the national-level measures 
included that has a residual variance of 6.81 ( from r in Equation (1) above) within 
nations and 0.63 between nations. This suggests that most of the variance is at 
the individual rather than national level. Furthermore by comparing the reduc- 
tion in variance of the two models we can see the impact of the second-level vari- 
ables. Model 1, the model with national covariate effects on means, but no 
national effects on individual-level parameters, accounts for 25% of the within- 
nation variance and 83% of the between-nation variance. Model 2 helps account 
for slightly more (26%) of the within-nation variance. Nonetheless, the model- 
ling of national-level effects does show significant impacts on the way in which 
political engagement takes place with some (modest) evidence of an amplifica- 
tion of political engagement by the presence of formal group arrangements in 
society. 
Conclusion: Bowling Together Might not Matter so Much as 
Singing Together 
Our analysis has shown evidence consistent with the argument of Putnam and 
the neo-Tocquevillians. That is, we see individual-level evidence that member- 
ship in some private, nonpolitical associations is associated with greater politi- 
cal engagement in Europe. This suggests that activity in such groups may 
generate democratic virtues. The nature of the group membership matters, 
however. Having said that, we ought to note that some of our findings are not 
consistent with the Putnam/neo-Tocquevillian arguments. Of the relatively non- 
political, noneconomic groups expected by neo-Toquevillians to be breeding- 
grounds for democratic virtues (arts, charities, church, sports, and youth groups), 
only arts and charities are associated with political engagement. To a lesser extent, 
14 Although in other estimates-not reported here-it does have an impact on satisfaction with 
democracy in a manner entirely consistent with Anderson's findings (Anderson and Guillory 1997). 
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national-level conditions may also affect how group membership is associated 
with engagement. 
Of course, correlation cannot establish causation, but the lack of association 
between membership in some of these groups and political engagement leads us 
to question how far we may generalize about the "educative role" that all volun- 
tary groups play in teaching democratic virtues. If voluntary groups play such a 
role, it would seem that not all are the same in their ability to do so. In other 
TABLE 2A 
HLM Estimates of Civic Engagement, additional controls used in 
models in Table 2 
Attitudinal measures Model 1 Model 2 
Conservative (scale) -.064 .026 -.064 .025 
Strong ideology .283 .053 .283 .053 
Supported Losing Party -.058 .127 -.060 .127 
Str. ideology*Loser .089 .073 .089 .073 
Finances much better .588 .196 .590 .195 
Finances better .201 .070 .201 .071 
Finances same - - - 
Finances worse .213 .106 .213 .107 
Finances much worse .060 .227 .055 .227 
Demographics 
Female -.619 .071 -.618 .071 
Married .126 .072 .127 .073 
Homeowner .033 .067 .031 .067 
Top income group .422 .142 .426 .142 
High income .198 .122 .202 .123 
Medium Income .074 .107 .080 .106 
Didn't reveal income - - - - 
Working Class -.427 .085 -.427 .085 
High Education .823 .107 .827 .107 
Medium Education .454 .073 .455 .073 
Student .852 .170 .854 .171 
Low Education - - - 
Age 15-25 -.465 .160 -.466 .161 
Age 25-34 -.308 .120 -.307 .120 
Age 35-44 -.105 .096 -.105 .096 
Age 45-54 
Age 55-64 -.082 .106 -.081 .107 
Age over 65 -.263 .138 -.263 .138 
Town .021 .082 .020 .081 
City .088 .104 .087 .103 
Rural area 
Note: Parameters in bold are significant at .05 level or better. A dash in place of a coefficient 
denotes the variable's reference category. 
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words, choirs and theatre guilds may help pave the path to democratic virtue, but 
bowling leagues or football clubs may not. To the extent that this pattern holds 
up elsewhere this suggests the neo-Tocquevillians may have to develop more 
nuanced arguments with regard to the kinds of social groups that might instill 
democratic virtues. 
While advancing our understanding of how groups may affect a citizen's 
engagement with democratic politics, this study also presents avenues for further 
research in this area. Our measures of group membership provide substantial vari- 
ation across nations and types of groups, but they may mute the effects of some 
activity and also blur differences across types of groups inside each category. 
Future surveys with better measures of involvement in groups may better clarify 
how far neo-Tocquevillian arguments may be extended. This could include meas- 
ures of time spent in activities associated with social groups. Research could be 
advanced further with better measures of various types of groups inside each of 
the categories used in this study. It is quite possible, for example, that not all 
sports groups are the same. Likewise, there might be substantial variation in the 
forms of group activity associated with what we categorize here as church or 
youth-group membership. It is difficult to imagine a nonexperimental social 
science research design that could provide the definitive test of causal relation- 
ships implicit in neo-Tocquevillian views on the effects of social groups on dem- 
ocratic virtues. Improved survey measures, however, could provide for additional 
tests of the relationships that we explored. 
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